AYESHA RASCOE, HOST:
When the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, America was joined by what President Bush called a coalition of the willing, including four European allies and Australia. In the military operation in Iran, the U.S. has just one partner - Israel. Joining us now from London to discuss this is Shashank Joshi. He's defense editor at The Economist. Good morning.
SHASHANK JOSHI: Good morning to you.
RASCOE: So how significant is it that European allies, especially the U.K., say they're not carrying out military strikes on Iran?
JOSHI: It's not surprising at all, given that they have grave reservations about a conflict whose war aims they see as unclear and unspecified and whose legality they see as questionable. But at the same time, whilst they have no intention to take part in this conflict directly, they are participants in a sense. I've just been hearing from British officials in the last hour or so that British troops in Bahrain were within a couple of hundred meters of - or a few hundred meters of an Iranian strike. So Britain has a presence at these bases in Bahrain, in Oman, elsewhere. France has a presence in the United Arab Emirates. We're directly exposed, and of course, the other question is, they are very pleased to see the end of the regime, the end of Khamenei. They're pleased to see it. So they don't necessarily oppose the effect, but they want no direct participation in it.
RASCOE: Well, I mean, then, you know, as you mentioned, then, is there a risk of European countries being pulled in if their troops end up getting hurt in some of these attacks?
JOSHI: I think there's two ways they could get drawn in. One of them is if their forces are killed or wounded in these attacks, and then they might be pulled in to some degree, though I think it is very unlikely that they would directly join airstrikes on Iran. But I think the second way is if there's significant attacks on Israel or other countries like Jordan that can't be repelled by their own indigenous air defenses and by the United States, then we could see European involvement for air defense purposes. And in fact, that is what we saw in previous rounds of strikes where France, Britain and others participated in the aerial defense of both Jordan and Israel from Iranian Shahed drones.
RASCOE: Well, in military terms, though, does the U.S. need European support?
JOSHI: No, it doesn't really. Now, there are some - there's some real estate that it could benefit from. The U.K. has a base, a very significant airbase in Cyprus, which is a key hub for flights moving through the eastern Mediterranean. It has considerable capacity. It has signals intelligence stations in Cyprus, which would give the Americans very, very important intelligence about Iranian naval movements and air movements. And, of course, Europeans could provide a lot of military firepower here, particularly if American air defense interceptors and air-to-air munitions - or air-to-ground munitions begin to run low. But on balance, this is a campaign that can be done by America and by Israel. And Israel, of course, has considerably more air power than any single European country on its own.
RASCOE: Well, are there any constraints on the U.S. and Israel to sustain this military campaign? Like - or is this something that the U.S. and Israel can easily do and maybe without and not at great cost?
JOSHI: No, no. There still are constraints. And I think if this goes on for weeks, you know, two weeks, three weeks, you will begin to see potentially significant stress placed upon Israel's stock of air defense interceptors to take out these Iranian ballistic missiles. And those ran low in last year's conflict, and you may begin to see more Iranian missiles get through as Israel is forced to choose which areas it defends and does not defend. That is a real constraint. Similarly, America's stockpile of Tomahawk cruise missiles and other precision-guided munitions, that could also become a constraint, but not for at least another week or so. I think that there's no question that'll be fine for a week at least.
RASCOE: What about Iran's military capabilities? I mean, are they at a level where they can actually do damage to U.S. or Israeli interests or other Gulf neighbors?
JOSHI: Their conventional military capability in the form of their air force and navy is weak to nonexistent. But, of course, as we can see very clearly around us today, their missile capacity, despite being heavily degraded by Israel last year, is a real problem and has already begun to strike, you know, densely populated cities like Dubai, including its airport, hotels. And that may not be very accurate, but it has a significant impact on business confidence in these areas.
RASCOE: And so, ultimately, I mean, do you think that Iran's allies, Russia and China, will offer them any meaningful military support?
JOSHI: I do not anticipate that, no. Of course, you know, they talk a good game. They're supportive of Iran, but they don't provide active military resupplies in this moment of conflict. I expect very little.
RASCOE: That's Shashank Joshi, defense editor at The Economist. Thank you so much for joining us.
JOSHI: Thank you for having me.
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